1. Petitioning Rights at “private” Shopping Centers
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   Condensed Version:
   U.S. Supreme Court PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) 447 U.S. 74
   PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER ET AL. v. ROBINS ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 79-289. Argued March 18, 1980. Decided June 9, 1980.
   Soon after appellees had begun soliciting in appellant privately owned shopping center’s central courtyard for signatures from passersby for petitions … a security guard informed appellees that they would have to leave because their activity violated shopping center regulations prohibiting any visitor or tenant from engaging in any publicly expressive activity that is not directly related to the center’s commercial purposes. Appellees immediately left the premises and later filed suit in a California state court … The trial court held that appellees were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the center is privately owned, and that such result does not infringe appellants’ property rights …Held:
   1. … A state constitutional provision is a “statute” within the meaning of 1257 (2), and in deciding that the State Constitution gave appellees the right to solicit signatures on appellants’ property, Article 1, 3, of the California Constitution provides: “[P]eople have the right to . . . petition government for redress of grievances.” (same as West Virginia State Constitution, Article III, § 16)
   2. State constitutional provisions, as construed to permit individuals reasonably to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited, do not violate the shopping center owner’s property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth …
   (a) The reasoning in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 – which held that the First Amendment does not prevent a private shopping center owner from prohibiting the distribution on center premises of handbills unrelated to the center’s operations …[Page 447 U.S. 74, 75]
   (b) …
   (c) …
   REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined; in Parts I, II, III, and IV of which WHITE and POWELL, JJ., joined; and in all but one sentence of which BLACKMUN, J., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 89. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment, post, p. 95. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 96. BLACKMUN, J., filed a statement concurring in part, post, p. 88.
   …
   MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
   …to decide the important federal constitutional questions it presented. Those are whether state constitutional provisions, which permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited, violate the shopping center owner’s property rights under the Fifth Amendment…
   The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitution protects “speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.” 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979). It concluded that appellees were entitled to conduct their activity on PruneYard property.
   … As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations (see Diamond [v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 665, 477 P.2d 733, 741 (1970)]) would not markedly dilute defendant’s property rights.’ ([Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 345, 521 P.2d 460, 470 (1974)] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)” Id., at 910-911, 592 P.2d, at 347-348.
   We now affirm.
   … We stated that property does not “lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes,” and that “[t]he essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center.” 407 U.S., at 569.
   …Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants’ property rights under the Taking Clause. There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center. … Appellees were orderly, and they limited their activity to the common areas of the shopping center. In these circumstances, the fact that they may have “physically invaded” appellants’ property cannot be viewed as determinative.
   …Most important, the shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please. The views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the owner.
   …There consequently is no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular message. Finally, as far as appears here appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of state law.
   …We conclude that neither appellants’ federally recognized property rights nor their First Amendment rights have been infringed by the California Supreme Court’s decision recognizing a right of appellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants’ property. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore Affirmed.
   As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created right of limited access to a specialized type of property. Ante, at 87, 87-88. But even when no particular message is mandated by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state action that forces a property owner to admit third-party speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself. For example, a law requiring that a newspaper permit others to use its columns imposes an unacceptable burden upon the newspaper’s First Amendment right to select material for publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality opinion). Such a right of access burdens the newspaper’s “fundamental right to decide what to print or omit.” Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, it is tantamount to compelled affirmation and, thus, presumptively unconstitutional. [Page 447 U.S. 74, 99]
   The selection of material for publication is not generally a concern of shopping centers.

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