On October 28, the Federalist Society posting this on-line debate over the National Popular Vote Plan, between Tara Ross (who argues for the existing system) and Maryland State Senator Jaime Raskin (who supports the National Popular Vote Plan). Thanks to Rick Hasen’s ElectionLawBlog for the link. Ross and most other supporters of the Electoral College as it functions today usually express hostility toward minor parties and independent candidates, and this debate is no exception for her.
The irony is that Electoral College, as it functions today, actually helps minor party and independent presidential candidates. Voters nowadays are generally aware of whether their own state is considered a “swing state”, or whether it is hopelessly “safe” for one of the two major party nominees. These aware voters take that information into consideration when deciding whether to vote for a minor party or independent presidential candidate or not. For instance, on October 28, Noam Chomsky said that since he lives in Massachusetts, he will be voting for Ralph Nader. Chomsky recommended that other voters who live in “safe” states, and who favor single-payer medical insurance, should likewise vote for Nader. If we had a direct popular vote for president, Chomsky would presumably be voting for Obama.
Don’t confuse anyone with reality. They have a system to dismantle.
Using the EC, the only way a minor party has gotten a vote is when the elector did not vote as he said he would when they voted for him. I don’t see how this systems helps getting minor parties elected, since that is the purpose of elections.
Getting a percentage of Parliament allows minor parties some say in how their government is run. In the US system, we have almost none.
As far as my actual vote, I follow Norm to a tee! The T is Twisted Logic. As an independent minded person, why would I want to help a Republican presidential candidate in a solid GOP state or a Democrat in a safe Blue state?
The EC is constitutional [like slavery and voting rights] but grossly unproductive and definately unprogressive!
Minor parties have carried states in 1968, 1924, 1912, 1896, 1892, 1860, 1856, and 1832. And a minor party presidential candidate carried states in 1948 but he was a major party nominee in those 4 states.
“Single-payer medical insurance” = socialized medicine.
Why can’t Texas give each voter 34 votes, to allocate among one or more electoral slates as each voter sees fit?
1) It would be a general election.
2) Votes would be cast for presidential slates by individual voters.
3) They would be counted on a statewide basis.
Would not any state that was a party to propose compact be obligated to count the 250 to 300 million votes from Texas in determining which presidential electors they appoint.
Or what if a state used the conventional way of choosing electors by district, where there are no statewide electors, but rather one elector chosen from each electoral district drawn for that specific purpose.
For example, Alaska would be divided into 3 electoral districts, Nebraska 5, or California 55. Would not under the NPV compact all such individual votes be discarded since they are not counted on a statewide basis.
Why doesn’t a state unilaterally appoint its electors according to the national popular vote.
Let’s say State of Jefferson has 10 EV, and its popular vote favored Candidate A. There are 4 possible national outcomes under the current rules:
1) A wins popular vote and A wins electoral vote.
2) B wins popular vote and B wins electoral vote.
3) A wins popular vote and B wins electoral vote.
4) B wins popular vote and A wins electoral vote.
Now Jefferson implements unilateral NPV.
1) No change in result.
2) Jefferson’s 10 EV switch from A to B, simply extending B’s mandate.
3) No change in result, but candidate and voter behaviour may change as they seek to capture Jefferson’s 10 EV.
4) Jefferson’s 10 EV switch from A to B, possibly tipping the national election to match the popular vote.
For example, in 1888 if we substitute New York for Jefferson, Cleveland is elected president. In 2000, there are any number of “Jefferson”s.
The downside of the kind of help that the current EC gives to small parties and independents is what happens if no candidate gets a majority of the electoral votes. Then the House of Representatives picks the President by unit rule — one vote per state delegation. The same limitation applies to proportional allocation of electors within each state when it is put forward as an alternative to NPV.
Under the United States Constitution, each State (legislature) has the authority to direct the manner in which its electors are appointed. In particular, they may determine the manner in which presidential candidates qualify for the ballot (in those 51* States that appoint their electors on the basis of the popular vote for presidential candidates.
There is no reason that the current Rube Goldberg nomination scheme be continued, unless you are particularly fond of balloons or Chairman Dean’s screams.
Instead hold a national primary to determine which candidates appear on the general election ballot. All candidates regardless of party would appear on the ballot, and all voters may participate. Any candidate who receives 1% of the vote would have their name placed on the general election ballot.
Initially, it may not be possible to get all States to participate. But States could join the compact – and there would be no compelling reason to wait (perhaps forever) for States with a majority of electoral votes to join.
Or alternatively, the member States could conduct a primary in non-member States. This same idea has been proposed by the originators of the NPV plan to cope with States that debauch
Re #9. I did not propose proportional allocation of electoral votes. I simply proposed giving each voter one vote per elector. This was how it was done throughout most of our country’s history.
States are not required to appoint their electors on “election day” (see 3 U.S.C. § 2). For example, they might provide for majority election of presidential electors; as well as handling contingencies such as death of elector candidates prior to the election or the meeting of electors in their State; or the inability of an elector to get to the meeting where presidential electors cast their vote (I think in 2004, this happened in Minnesota or some other snowbelt State).
In providing for such contingencies, 3 U.S.C. § 2 is parallel to 3 U.S.C. § 8, which provides the authority for States to conduct runoff elections for Congress. When the uniform congressional election date was first established in 1871, the “vacancy” provision was specifically directed to the holding of runoffs.
So a better National Popular Vote initiative would provide that if no presidential slate received a majority of the “popular vote”, that a runoff election be held to determine which electors were appointed. Since the members of the NPV compact would constitute a majority of the EV, they could simply count the popular vote in their States to establish who would become President.