1. Aren’t those two kind of incompatible? How do you compute the national popular vote when your state doesn’t use plurality voting?

2. The IRV vote passed by the Vermont legislature didn’t relate to presidential elections. It only related to US Senate and US House.

3. How is it even possible to do a statewide contest with IRV?

   IRV cannot be tallied at individual polling places since it is not additive.

   Would Vermont hold separate elections for the US Senate and US House, to make tallying less laborious?

   IRV is complicated to count, and if you thought the Coleman Franken contest was drawn out, imagine when you ask voters to “pick three” and rank them.

4. IRV is already used in many elections that have multiple polling places, such as San Francisco, which has approximately 600 polling places. In fact San Francisco has a greater population than Vermont.

5. 1 –

   This raises an interesting question to ponder, especially by those who oppose NPV but support IRV. If the NPV compact is enacted, wouldn’t individual states be incented to enact IRV for their own presidential elections? Doing so could have the effect of increasing the number of votes their state would contribute to the calculation of the national popular vote tally (assuming the presence of three or more parties on their ballots).

   3 –

   I know Vermont is predominantly rural, but do they not have any computers? Electricity?

6. This also brings up the question of total votes in a different way. As I understand the National Vote Plan would throw the election to whichever candidate wins the most votes Nationally, so how can you have IRV in any state?

   During the last 5 election’s there have been 6 or 7 candidates on enough ballots to theoretically win the Presidency. However, these candidates were generally ALL on the ballot in around 20 states. That excludes the dozen or so other candidates who were on more than one ballot.

   IRV works for San Francisco’s Mayor race because every voter has the same choice of candidates. Obviously, many state ballots would be different for President. So depending on which of the minor candidates were on the ballot in any particular state the ranked order would be different for a fair number of voters. Which could change the likelihood of which candidate would win 50% of the vote in that state.

   Additionally, does IRV require the winner to get 50% of the total ballots cast for that office or just 50% of those who have picked from the entire list? In some elections there have been some candidates that I would never pick. So would my ballot even be counted from the beginning or be eliminated when the recounts have gone through all of my choices? Then does that reduce the number of ballots for the 50% requirement needed by the winner?

7. Uh-oh. I see some NPV supporters getting nervous.

   That’s one of the positive aspects of having electoral votes. Each state runs its election however it wants, including how it tallies votes and determines a “winner”. The NPV compact is rather hinged on the assumption that all states will use plurality voting to award its electoral votes.

8. 7 –

   I disagree with your interpretation of NPV “hinging” on plurality voting. Since the states can determine how they allocate their electoral votes in whatever way they want (as you concede) there is no reason at all why the states joining the compact can’t accept the “run-off” majority and “run-off” second place totals from each state using IRV when they determine the national popular vote total.

   Do I look nervous? Gee, I don’t feel nervous.

9. Vermont’s secretary of state supported the IRV bill and had a plan for getting the count done before the state did a full-scale change to having IRV-ready voting equipment where, like in San Francisco, all the information from the ballots is collected at the precincts.

   IRV is already used in major international elections, including all of Ireland in its presidential race. Ireland has 43 regional counting centers and does the count of more than a million votes in about 8-10 hours the day after the elections. You also can do preliminary tallies on election night in districts, as done in Australia.

   IRV is counted by hand in those nations, but you also can count IRV on optical scan, as typically done in US implementations. You can read about our suggestions for doing those elections securely, with audits, here:
   http://www.fairvote.org/?page=2470

10. The NPV scheme does not define what a “vote” is, and there is nothing to prevent a state from letting a voter cast several votes for a single presidential slate (as is done for cumulative voting) or to vote for several presidential slates. The members of the compact will be legally bound to count any such votes unthinkingly.

    There is no good reason that the NPV scheme could not incorporate a runoff procedure, nor provide for a national direct primary election for nominating candidates, nor common set of candidates, common voter qualifications, and a coordinated canvassing and recount procedure.

11. Jim –

    Do you get your material directly from Rush?

12. There is not a worse, more unfair method for counting votes than the instant runoff method that gives the voters of the least popular candidates the most say in which candidates are eliminated early on.

    Read Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
    18 Flaws and 4 Benefits

    http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

    As in the recent Burlington VT and Aspen elections this “feature” of IRV often causes the most popular majority-favorite candidates to be eliminated early and a more extremist, less popular candidate (even a candidate who a majority of voters oppose) to be elected.

    Of course IRV has many many other disadvantages besides its unequal treatment of voters’ votes, whereby your 2nd choice vote may never be considered, or may only be considered after your 2nd choice is eliminated – even though your 1st choice candidate loses. There is truly not a worse method than IRV. Let’s hope that the new Governor has the same common sense as Douglas does.

13. Hey JR –

    I’m with you! All those things you mentioned should have been included in the NPV compact. A cure for cancer would have been nice, too. And while they were at it, why didn’t they recharter the U.N.? And change the six pack to a nine pack? And they really and truly should have called for the addition of HOV lanes at the express counters of supermarkets.

14. #13 Are you Susan posting under yet another nym?

15. Kathy (#12).

    I know your antipathy to IRV knows no bounds, but you allege inccurately that non-Condorcet candidate won in Aspen. Meanwhile, in Burlington, the Condorcet candidate (e.g., the one who would theoretically defeat all others in a one-on-one race) was in third after first choices were counted and after the field was reduced to three. So plurality voting and traditional runoffs would have not have elected this third-lace candidate either, but a plurality system in Burlington would have elected a candidate who would have lost one-on-one to both the second and third place winners.

    IRV has been used for literally thousands of federal elections in countries like Australia and Ireland and has been used by countless major organizations for years. Your legal efforts to stop Minneapolis from using IRV failed and will fail in Aspen as well. Meanwhile, it doesn’t seem like you do anything to advance other reforms, which suggests you are an agent of the status quo and would prefer current plurality voting and runoff methods — both of which are more likely to fail to elect the Condorcet winner than IRV.

    What do you want instead of IRV? Plurality voting? Traditional runoffs? Other changes that have basically no track record at all?

16. IRV EXTREME EXAMPLE 25 JUNE 2009

    Times are ROUGH and TOUGH — like 1860, 1932, 2000, 2004, 2008 – 2009.

    49 H W S
    49 S W H
    1 W H S
    99

    Place Votes Table
    1 2 3

    H 49 1 49 99
    S 49 0 50 99
    W 1 98 0 99

    99 99 99

    With IRV, W loses. H beats S 50-49 — with or without a Civil WAR.

    Head to head (Condorcet method) —
    W beats H 50-49
    W beats S 50-49
    W WINS.

    IF the first 2 place votes are *YES* votes (as in Approval Voting), then —

    H 50
    S 49
    W 99
    W WINS

    IF the Bucklin Method is used (add place votes to get a majority), then adding the place 1 and place 2 votes —

    H 50
    S 49
    W 99
    W WINS

    H Hitler, S Stalin, W George Washington (U.S.A. General in the 1775-1783 American Revolutionary War and the first U.S.A. President in 1789-1797)

    IRV is super-dangerous since it ignores most of the data in a place votes table [i.e. a BLATANT 14th Amdt Equal Protection Clause violation] — regardless of the New Age mindless math MORONS hyping IRV in various places — especially for single offices.

    IRV WILL nominate / elect HITLER / STALIN type extremists — who will claim a IRV mighty majority *mandate* [M3] for their EVIL stuff — while defeating compromise candidates — especially for offices like President, Governor, Mayor, etc.
    ———
    HOWEVER — A-L-L voting methods have problems with 3 or more choices — BECAUSE if a 3rd new choice is added to 2 existing choices, then the new choice may (1) beat both, (2) lose to both or (3) beat one but lose to the other (aka a Circular Tie — requiring a tie breaker rule — such as Approval Voting).

    See

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system

    —-
    Pending utopia –
    P.R. for legislative bodies.
    Approval Voting for NONPARTISAN executive/judicial offices.
    NO extremist party hack primaries, caucuses and conventions are needed.

17. #16: If 99% of the American people want a totalitarian state, there is no way that the other 1% can stop them, regardless of the voting system used.

18. 10 –

    There are actually many GOOD reasons that the NPV compact should not have been written in an attempt to fix more electoral ills than just the antiquated, broken, ludicrous winner-take-all Electoral College “scheme.” Chief among them though, would be that doing so would give folks like you, who oppose the sole objective of NPV as written, additional reasons to cavil about its details.

    But perhaps I’m wrong. Tell us, then…tell us that if NPV had been written to cover everything that you list in your second paragraph…would you now be supporting it?

    A simple “yes” or “no” will suffice.

    Thanks.

19. #18 Uniform definition of Elector in ALL of the U.S.A.

    P.R. for legislative bodies

    A.V. for NONPARTISAN executive/judicial officers

    How soon before the EVIL party hack control freak gerrymander MONSTERS in Deficit City pass THE law that causes Civil WAR II ?

    See the earlier party hacks at work –

    1773 Tea Tax Act in the U.K. regime — result American Revolutionary WAR.

    1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act in the gerrymander U.S.A. Congress — result Civil WAR I.

    The EVIL leftwing / rightwing gerrymander DEVILS from Hell in power do NOT give a damn about anything except their EVIL power — regardless of what happens to civilization.

    The NPV scheme is one more NIGHTMARE COMPLEX/LOOPHOLE *fix* dreamed up by EVIL MORONS from Hell trying to brainwash the public.

20. 20 –

    I may be an EVIL MORON, but I am actually from Rhode Island. Some consider it Hell, particularly Republicans who generally don’t get to vote for President.

    And I wouldn’t think of trying to brainwash you. Someone seems to have already done a pretty thorough job, although they might have gone a little lighter on the scouring pads, eh?

    Peace out, babe.

21. #18 So if I understand your “argument”, the “good” reason for not having a common set of candidates for all voters to choose from among is because there would be discussion about the actual details of who those candidates were?

    Why can’t a state unilaterally adopt use of the national popular vote for determining its electoral vote? Why is there a need for a compact.

22. 21 –

    Jim – someone is clearly posing and posting as you. The imposter has no reading comprehension skill, evidently lacks even basic mathematical skills, thinks in a disorganized and illogical manner.

    He can’t even provide an answer to a simple “yes/no” question (18).

    You really should complain to someone.

23. 8 –

    Okay, I can see the compact computing a national tally using only “first choice” from a state using IRV, although I doubt each state would change its laws overnight.

    What if a state [outside the compact] adopts Approval voting? Answer: the compact is boned. There’s no way to integrate the tally of a preferential system with the tally of a scoring system.

24. 23 –

    Well…let’s see. Popes are voted in by an approval system, I think. And the Doge of Venice used to be elected that way back when people elected Doges.

    And I suppose it’s possible that an aggrieved state legislature might consider adopting such a system to “bone” the NPV compact if it comes into effect.

    But…since we don’t have any states that vote that way now, and since it’s highly unlikely that any state electorate would understand much less approve of an approval system of voting for president, and since it is quite likely that a majority of the legislatures’ own constituency would actually support the NPV plan, I think it’s more likely that such a legislature would join the compact than institute an approval method out of pure petulance.

25. #23 That would be no problem for the NPV compact which leaves it up to the election authorities in each member state to determine the votes from the non-member states. So some states might count an approval vote for a presidential slate to be one vote for that presidential slate; others might disregard the vote from Approval voting states; others might try to apportion the Approval votes as if it were a cumulative vote. Then there could lawsuits filed in each state, and ultimately the Supreme Court or Congress could decide.

26. 25 –

    No comment. You’re clearly an impostor. The real Jim Riley would have answered the simple yes/no question what was posed in 18.

27. The language of the NPV compact assumes that all states (both in the compact and outside of it) use plurality voting. It could probably be interpreted to make use of results from ranked ballot elections in specific states, but probably not without disputes that would have to be settled by the courts, probably based on facts that would give a whole new meaning to the phrase “political thicket”. My bet is that, at the end of this process, in an IRV state, only first preferences would count in the national totals used by the compact states. Yes, that would defeat the purpose of IRV, which explains why I don’t go along with Harley’s (#5) idea that NPV creates an incentive for states to adopt IRV.

    It would be at least extremely difficult, probably impossible, to write a compact incorporating IRV or top-two runoff. How would the compact states treat votes cast in non-compact states? So don’t think Jim (#10) is right about putting a majority voting rule in a compact. His other changes, including uniform ballot access, voter qualifications and integrity/audit procedures, could be agreed to by compact, with implementation limited to the compact states themselves.

    This whole discussion leaves unasked the really important question about NPV and IRV. Would implementation of the compact pave the way for consideration of national adoption of a majority voting rule by constitutional amendment, because it makes the electoral college irrelevant? Or would NPV be the end point of the reform process for decades to come?

28. #27 The compact states could simply re-use the November results for the non-compact states (unless a non-compact states held a runoff to determine its own electoral vote).

    Alternatively, the compact states could hold a Top 2 primary in September. Then in November, they could simply disregard the vote for other candidates from non-compact member States. This would avoid timing problems with a post-November runoff, while still including votes from non-member States.

    It is quite unlikely that a candidate who did not appear on the ballot in states constituting over half of the electoral vote would have significant support in November in the non-member States. Would-be supporters would know that their vote was essentially wasted.

    Ballot access for the national Top 2 primary could be (at most) 1/10 of 1% of the votes cast in a State in the previous presidential election (13,000 or so in California, 250 in Wyoming and Delaware). Candidates qualifying in a majority of the member States or in member States with a majority of the electoral vote for the compact would qualify in all States.

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