On September 18, a candidate for Mayor of Central Falls, Rhode Island, filed a federal lawsuit to invalidate a city ordinance that says that if a voter signs petitions for two different candidates for the same office, the signature counts for the candidate who submits his or her petition first, and is void for the other candidate. The case is Fontes v City of Central Falls.
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld laws that say a voter may sign for only one candidate for a particular office. However, generally when jurisdictions limit a voter to signing for only one candidate per office, that jurisdiction provides that the signatures should be dated. Petitions for city office in Central Falls don’t seem to have space for a date.
The case arose when Hipolito Fontes was told that he only had 197 valid signatures to run for Mayor, even though he submitted 333 signatures to meet a requirement of 200. Fontes says that campaign workers for a rival candidate followed him while he was petitioning, and endeavored to persuade voters who had signed his petition to then sign the rival petition. Fontes also says that city elections officials manipulated the process by which each candidate tried to file at the first moment permitted for filing such petitions.
Which State regime is THE most EVIL moronic ???
Used to be Florida in 2000 — now RI ???
See Dorr’s War in RI in the 1840s — a de facto revolution in RI regarding gerrymanders and Elector definition — one of the events leading up to the horrific 1861 Civil WAR I.
ALL election law steps are supposed to be YES (legal) or NO (illegal) — so that mere EVIL humans can NOT manipulate the process.
What’s the point of limiting the number of petitions a voter can sign?
#2)
Obviously they want to limit competition. I believe some states don’t accept signatures from individuals that vote in primaries (they probably say it’s like voting it two primaries).
Texas is the only state remaining that won’t let people sign for a new party or an independent candidate, if that voter already voted in the primary. Also Nebraska has that restriction but only for independent presidential petitions.
Once there were 10 states with the restriction, but gradually they have been repealed, except in Texas and the limited Nebraska one. For one thing, they make more work for elections officials who check petitions.
#4 In Texas, larger parties nominate by primary, smaller parties by a series of conventions which begin with voting precinct conventions and end with a state convention. Larger parties also hold these series of conventions, but they are not used for nominations, other than indirectly as part of the presidential nominating process.
Texas does not have party registration, but voters are restricted to affiliation with a single party during an even-numbered year. Affiliation commonly occurs when a voter votes in the primary or the primary runoff; but can also occur when a voter attends a convention or signs a petition for a candidate seeking a place on the primary ballot; or other similar activities.
New parties also nominate using the convention system. They qualify for the general election ballot based on the number of voters who attendance their precinct conventions. If you vote in the Republican primary, you can’t attend a precinct convention for the Democratic or Libertarian parties, nor that of a new party.
Texas does permit new parties to supplement their attendance roster with signatures of voters who did not attend the precinct conventions of the party nor affiliate with another party, but this should not be seen as any different than other acts of affiliation with the new party, nor not subjection to the rule of restricting voting to one party’s nomination activities.
The system is not remarkably different from that in California where all parties nominate by primary, and voters register their intent to affiliate with a party at the next primary election. New parties qualify to hold a primary when sufficient voters register their intent to affiliate with the new party in advance.
Sotomayor years ago mis-used a hearing (USCA 2nd Circuit) to reaffirm the right of enrolled party members to invade independent nominating petitioning after the California SCOTUS decision regarding open primaries.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER
AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY
OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY
OTHER COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR
IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at
the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
the 3rd
day of May
Two thousand and one.
PRESENT:
Honorable Pierre N. Leval,
Honorable Robert D. Sack,
Honorable Sonia Sotomayor,
Circuit Judges.
H. William Van Allen and
Fairlene G. Rabenda,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-v.-
George Pataki et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
No.
00-9068
Appearing for Appellant:
JAMES E. MORGAN, Law Offices of Galvin & Morgan,
Delmar, NY.
Appearing for Appellee:
ANDREA OSER, Assistant Solicitor General, Albany, NY
(Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York,
Daniel Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, and Nancy A.
Spiegel Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), for defendant-
appellee George Pataki.
TODD DAVIS VALENTINE, Albany, NY, for defendants-
appellees New York State Board of Elections, Columbia
County Board of Elections, Dutchess County Board of
Elections, Greene County Board of Elections, and Ulster County
Board of Elections.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Hurd, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Prior to the November 2000 election, H. William Van Allen and Fairlene G.
Rabenda
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, seeking a declaration that
New York’s Election Laws
§§ 6-138 and 6-140 violate their First Amendment right to freedom of
association and their Fourteenth
Amendment rights to Equal Protection and Due Process. The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs’
complaint, and they appealed. We find no error and therefore affirm.
New York’s Election Law allows any individual, whether enrolled in a
political party or
not, to sign an independent nominating petition for elected office. See N.
Y. Election Law §§ 6-138 and
6-140 (McKinney 1998). The plaintiffs are registered voters, not enrolled
in any political party, who
wish to restrict eligibility to sign independent nominating petitions to
non-enrolled registered voters.
As for the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, we find that the plaintiffs
have failed to
allege injury-in-fact and, therefore, lack standing to assert this claim.
See Lee v. Board. of Governors,
118 F.3d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs did not allege, for
example, that they had circulated or
intended to submit a nominating petition for any elected office. See Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 564 (1992). Moreover, the plaintiffs did not claim that the
requirements of §§ 6-138 and 6-
140 eliminated their associational right to have their nominating
petitions signed by whomever they
choose or coerced them into allowing enrolled party members to sign their
petitions. To the extent that
the plaintiffs claim to be injured by the increased burden §§ 6-138 and 6-
140 place on the non-enrolled
registered voter by increasing the percentage of signatures they must
obtain in order to nominate a
candidate, removal of the requirements would not eliminate the burden
because New York election law
requires a specific number of signatures regardless of whether enrolled
party members are allowed to
sign. See N.Y. Election Law 6-142 (McKinney 1998). We reject the
plaintiffs’ equal protection claim
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because the plaintiffs have not shown that they were subjected to any
intentional or purposeful
discrimination, see Gelb v. Board. of Elections, 224 F.3d 149, 154 (2d.
Cir. 2000), or that they have
been treated differently from others similarly situated, see City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Finally, the plaintiffs’ due process claim
fails because the plaintiffs have
not demonstrated that § 6-138 or § 6-140 causes something more than an
unintended irregularity in the
conduct of elections. See Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 801 (2d Cir.
1996). We have considered
the plaintiffs’ other arguments and find them to be without merit.
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