1. If re-programming was made necessary anyway, why not undo the glitch? If you don’t want to eliminate straight-ticket voting, as I presume Pence and the IN Legislature didn’t, why would you want to make it less useful?

2. In Indiana, you can override a straight ticket on individual races. So if you vote:

   ###############
   Example 1

   Straight Ticket
   [X] Demo-Rep
   [ ] Liberal Conservative
   [ ] Radical Moderate

   Town Crier
   [ ] Andy Smith (D-R)
   [X] Bill Smith (LC)
   [ ] Carl Smith (RM)

   Then your vote for Town Crier is for Bill, and not Andy. If you had skipped the office of Town Crier, then your vote is counted for your straight-ticket Demo-Rep candidate, Andy Smith.

   ################
   Example 2.

   Now consider a multi-seat office:

   Straight Ticket
   [X] Demo-Rep
   [ ] Liberal Conservative
   [ ] Radical Moderate

   Town Watchmen (Vote for not more than three
   [ ] Dave Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Ed Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Fred Smith (D-R)
   [ ] George Smith (LC)
   [ ] Harry Smith (LC)
   [ ] Ivan Smith (LC)
   [ ] Joe Smith (RM)
   [ ] Kevin Smith (RM)

   You have voted for Dave, Ed, and Fred, the Demo-Rep candidates based on your straight-ticket vote.

   ################
   Example 3

   Straight Ticket
   [X] Demo-Rep
   [ ] Liberal Conservative
   [ ] Radical Moderate

   Town Watchmen (Vote for not more than three
   [ ] Dave Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Ed Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Fred Smith (D-R)
   [X] George Smith (LC)
   [ ] Harry Smith (LC)
   [ ] Ivan Smith (LC)
   [ ] Joe Smith (RM)
   [ ] Kevin Smith (RM)

   Who do you want? You wanted George. But you also said that you wanted any Demo-Rep candidate. But since you can’t vote for 4, which if any of the three Demo-Reps do you want to vote for?

   ################
   Example 4

   Straight Ticket
   [X] Demo-Rep
   [ ] Liberal Conservative
   [ ] Radical Moderate

   Town Watchmen (Vote for not more than three
   [X] Dave Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Ed Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Fred Smith (D-R)
   [X] George Smith (LC)
   [ ] Harry Smith (LC)
   [ ] Ivan Smith (LC)
   [ ] Joe Smith (RM)
   [ ] Kevin Smith (RM)

   So now we have George and Dave. But you didn’t indicate that you didn’t want to vote for Ed or Fred. If there were no straight-ticket vote, it is OK to vote for less than the full number.

   ################
   Example 5

   Straight Ticket
   [ ] Demo-Rep
   [ ] Liberal Conservative
   [X] Radical Moderate

   Town Watchmen (Vote for not more than three
   [ ] Dave Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Ed Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Fred Smith (D-R)
   [X] George Smith (LC)
   [ ] Harry Smith (LC)
   [ ] Ivan Smith (LC)
   [ ] Joe Smith (RM)
   [ ] Kevin Smith (RM)

   In this case, since the Radical Moderates only had two candidates, the voter has only voted for three candidates, his exceptional vote for George, as well as his straight-ticket vote for the Radical Moderate

   ################
   On a paper ballot, there are a set of rules that can be applied.

   In Example 3, your potential vote for all three Demo-Rep candidates would result in an overvote, so only your vote for George counts. In example 4, your potential vote all three Demo-Rep candidates would result in an overvote, so only your vote for George counts. Your vote for Dave is ignored. This probably does not reflect what the voter’s intent was – but like Example 3, it is not clear how to interpret the intent. In addition, on a paper ballot a voter might include additional instructions, such as crossing out a name – which an election clerk might be able to interpret.

   On a scanned ballot, a vote-counting machine could interpret the marks the same way a paper ballot was (but without the ability to interpret extraneous marks). But if the vote-counting machine was expected to flag undervotes, then that could confuse voters. Paper ballots have the advantage that the voter is long gone, and oblivious to their ambiguity.

   On a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) device, there can be interaction with the voter. If a voter has marked a straight ticket, then when they get down to the race in question, their choices can be pre-marked, and there can be away to deselect candidates. So in the case of Examples 3 and 4, the Demo-Rep candidates can be selected. You could not select another candidate until you have deselected one of the three.

   Alternatively, as soon as you voted for the Radical Moderate candidate, the votes for the three Demo-Rep candidates could be cleared. But that would likely cause the voter to be confused, even if that was his intent. And what if he had voted for one of the two Radical Moderate candidates.

   The “technical glitch” is not a technical glitch, but a mismatch of different technologies, and expectations. It would be like if you insisted that driving a car should reproduce the same experience as walking. In that case, a car could not go more than 5 miles per hour, and it would have to fueled by Cheerios or eggs.

   The issue was brought to the legislature in early January by a county election official. The chair of the senate elections committee tried to draft a bill that would give voters a more complete explanation of how their vote would be interpreted, but gave up because the instructions were becoming impossibly complex.

   The Senate Elections Committee had a hearing on January 25 (this is apparently a short session, so they quickly drafted a bill (SB 61 was a vehicle bill – other states call them shell bills, other states simply gut a bill on an entirely different subject).

   The last witness, who was from Microvote, which is the elections vendor for about 60% of Indiana’s votes, gave the best explanation.

   The following four items are incompatible:
   (1) Straight ticket;
   (2) Optical scan;
   (3) Multi-seat offices;
   (4) Clear interpretation of voter’s intent.

   Presumably (4) is non-negotiable, and there is no political will to do away with straight ticket voting (1). Conceivably, they could get rid of multi-seat offices (3), which are apparently only local, such as cities, counties, and townships. But that is really not something to be done on short notice in the middle of an election year. Or they could get rid of optical scan ballots (3), but that would require expenditure of money. So the choice that was made was to get rid of the combination of (1) straight ticker and (3) multi-seat offices.

   The witness from Microvote indicated that he didn’t think it would be feasible to get the voting machines recertified until next spring, so there may have to be paper ballots used for this year.

   The Democrats on the committee were doing a lot of posturing. One wondered what would happen if someone who could not read was voting, and noting that civil rights laws forbid literacy tests. He couldn’t explain what happens now if someone can not read.

   Another went on a rant about his brother who had been wounded in Vietnam, and about poor children deserving representation, and thus a voter should be able to do whatever the he– they wanted to in the voting booth.

   What of course is not recognized is that there would be no self-informed intent to make a mark on a sheet of paper and have it count for all candidates of a party, or based on some other characteristic such as age, sex, race, letters in last names, facial hair, etc.

   If I would suggest that there be boxes for these, the legislators would ridicule the idea, or ask why I would want to do that. They wouldn’t understand if I claimed I should be able to do whatever the he– I wanted to in the voting booth.

   Rather than voter intent, it is actually the partisan politician’s intent that voters vote a straight ticket. In truth, if they could force voters to vote for all candidates of one party, they would.

3. Before Michigan’s recent switch away from straight-ticket, we too were able to vote what we called a “mixed ticket” (straight but with exceptions versus “split” as voting race by race without using the straight-ticket device). So I understand the examples — better than some of our “election inspectors” did, alas — and I don’t know how Michigan handled the issue. OTOH, it would generally only apply to either

   * township offices with multiple positions (mostly just the board itself); or

   * the four statewide education boards (State Board of Education, U-M Board of Regents, MSU Board of Trustees, and Wayne State University Board of Governors).

   Still, I would think that some sort of instruction could be given — to the people as well as the machines. The simplest way I can think of is to treat the override as absolute — i.e., once you split/mix your straight ticket in a multi-seat race, your vote only goes to the candidate[s] you have directly chosen (so if you wanted to vote for two people, make sure to mark two boxes/ovals/etc.).

   I agree that Ds and Rs tend to like straight-ticket; I believe the Rs here felt it was hurting their candidates for the education boards (which are rather far down the ballot). Of course, time in the “voting booth” will be affected — and the money purportedly for more equipment is in the control of the (partisan) Secretary of State, not the (also partisan but closer to the problem areas) county clerks who more directly run elections here. So I wonder if the main impact will be even longer lines in poorer areas (less able to afford more equipment) or a move toward actually enforcing the “two-minute drill” statute here — MCL 168.786:

   http://www.legislature.mi.gov/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-168-786

   /========================================\
   Only 1 voter at a time shall be permitted to pass within the guard rail to vote. The operating of the voting machine by the elector while voting shall be secret and obscure, from all other persons, except as provided by this act in cases of assisted electors or a minor child accompanying an elector in the booth or voting compartment under section 736a. A voter shall not have the right to remain within the voting machine booth longer than 2 minutes and if he or she refuses to leave it after the lapse of 2 minutes, the voter shall be removed by the inspectors. However, the inspectors may grant the voter further time in their discretion.
   \========================================/

   Finally . . . I’m interested to see/hear what happens if/when a whole state goes back to (presumably non-scannable) paper ballots.

4. Oh, yes — and it was nice of you to give frequent commenter DemoRep his own party. . . . :]

5. At one time the two parties in North Dakota were the Nonpartisan League and the Independent Voters Association. The NPL eventually merged with the Democratic Party, so that the formal name of the Democratic Party in North Dakota is Democratic-Nonpartisan League (similar in name structure to the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota.

   I believe that the North Dakota affiliate of the Democratic-Republican party is the Democratic-Libertarian-Green-Republican-Socialist-Prohibition Party (ND DLGRSP) (Pronunciation Dill-G(i)rr-Espy.

6. The interpretation of straight ticket ballots in Indiana is contained in IC 3-12-1-7, particularly subsections (c),(d), and (e). In Michigan, the interpretation is in MCL 168.737(c).

   The basic assumption in Indiana is that you can not vote for individual candidates of your straight-ticket party, and so explicitly marking one of three does not indicate disfavor of the other two. So in my examples, the vote for

   [X] Demo-Rep
   [X] Dave Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Ed Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Fred Smith (D-R)

   and

   [X] Demo-Rep
   [ ] Dave Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Ed Smith (D-R)
   [ ] Fred Smith (D-R)

   are totally equivalent, regardless whether you mark any candidates of other parties.

   The exception is in IC 3-12-1-7(c) that says if too many individual candidates are marked, all votes for the office are disregarded. That is, voting for Dave AND 3 candidates of other parties, I have spoilt my vote for the office. It may be intended to simplify cases (d) and (e).

   IC-3-12-1-7(d) is the case where individual marks are only made for candidates that are not of the straight-ticket party. Those votes count. The votes for candidates of the straight-ticket party are counted if it would not cause an overvote. So if it is a 3-member office, and the straight-ticket party has 3 candidates and a vote is made for an additional candidate, then the vote is technically for four candidates, but is resolved by dropping the straight-ticket candidate. If the straight-ticket party only had two candidates, then there is no overvote and each of the straight-ticket candidates and the other candidates get a vote.

   IC-3-12-1-7(e) is the case where individual marks are made for candidates that are both candidates of the straight-party not of the straight-ticket party. The votes for candidates of other parties count. The votes for candidates of the straight-ticket party are ignored and it is treated like case (d).

   A case can be made that this is NOT the intent of the voter. If a voter marks two other candidates, and one of his straight-ticket candidates, he probably really did mean to vote for those three candidates.

   I’m still not clear what the precise “technical glitch” is. It may be that vote-scanning machines have been programmed to not warn about votes being discarded in the case of IC-3-12-1-7(d) and (e). Since they may be technically overvotes, the original programming might have been to give an error beep and a warning, so that a voter could go correct their ballot if they chose to do so. But these instances would likely confuse a voter – and getting an explanation from a an election judge would either compromise the secret ballot or require a convoluted explanation that the voter could not understand.

   Chicago had a device that would validate punchcard ballots. In actual tests, election clerks would handle undervote warnings differently. In some cases, they would grab the ballot and punch out the chad for a candidate, perhaps saying “I’ll fix that”. In other cases, they would simply go ahead and deposit the ballot, perhaps saying, “Don’t worry about it, it’s a computer glitch”. Or they might tell the voter to figure it out for themselves.

   On a direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machine there was apparently a check that would prevent an overvote. On the DRE that I am familiar with, if you make a second selection for an office, it simply changes the vote to the new choice. It is impossible to overvote. It is also possible to un-vote, by selecting a selected candidate a second time. Since it is a specialized computer, it works like a conventional GUI interface. If you want to uncheck a check box you click it again. If you want to change a radio button, you click another.

   This has caused confusion with the straight ticket device. You click on the Demo-Rep straight ticket, and it will pre-select all the candidates of a particular party. You go down to the gubernatorial race and click on the Demo-Rep candidate and he would be unvoted. This led to litigation over the voting machines in Dallas County, including an appeal to the SCOTUS, and eventual removal of the Dallas County election administrator. The voting machines are now programmed to give a warning when this is done, requiring a confirmation before an unvote overrides a straight-ticket vote.

   In discussion before a legislative committee, this was compared to paper ballots. A Republican representative who probably had been politically active for 50 years, said that she had been told to be sure to always vote for every Republican candidate in addition to the straight ticket, because the Democrats would mark an override on any skipped office. A long-time Democrat elections lawyer referred to a vote for individual offices as a “for sure” vote. At one time, boxes on a ballot were numbered, so a candidate might encourage voters to mark box 27 on their ballot. Because the straight ticket boxes were one and two on the ballot, voters were urged to “vote one and done” or “vote two and through”.

   In 1948 in Texas, when paper ballots were used with party columns, the way to vote for a candidate was to strike through their name, rather than mark a box next to the name. A vertical strike was also considered valid, so if you wanted to vote a straight ticket, you could draw a line down an entire party column. If you wanted to vote a split ticket, you would leave gaps in the vertical line, and go over to an adjacent column and strike their name. There was not a straight-ticket device per se, but just an efficient way of voting straight-ticket.

   In Michigan, according to MCL 168.737(c), when you vote for a candidate outside your straight-ticket party for a multi-member office, you must strike one of your straight-ticket candidates. If you fail to do so, then it is assumed that you struck the candidate opposite the other candidate you did vote for.

   It is conceivable that a vote for one of the straight-ticket candidates is considered to strike one (or all) of the others that you don’t strike, but I don’t know.

   In Texas, multi-member races are by position, so instead of (Vote for not more than 3) you have 3 separate races, with candidates running for separately for each position.

   I think the response of politicians is reactionary. They infer that behind any change there is a motive of voting them out of office. But they can’t say that, but have to rationalize how they are protecting the voter.

   In the Indiana committee hearing, one senator thought he had an insight that the problem was a machine interpreting the voter’s intent. No, the machine was programmed to follow the law.

   I’ve heard legislators argue that if they have carefully studied every race on the ballot, and then happen to notice that all the candidates they had selected were of the same party, shouldn’t they be able to efficiently vote for them all. Of course you should senator, because someone who takes twice as long to carefully study every race on a ballot and chose candidates of different parties, is obviously picking candidates at random.

   The time argument also breaks down. If a county is buying and voting machines based on X% of the voters voting straight-ticket. Then when they deploy the machines in different precincts they have to take into account that different areas have different percentages of straight-ticket voters, or they will have lines in areas where there are fewer straight-ticket voters. You may be coercing voters to vote straight ticket.

7. Thanks for the further input, Mr. Riley. Unfortunately, there is no more MCL 168.737; see

   http://www.legislature.mi.gov/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-168-737

   It was deleted by House Bill 4992 of 2011, which became Public Act 128 of 2012:

   http://www.legislature.mi.gov/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=2011-HB-4992

8. For the many unaware folks –
   Demo Rep = Democracy Republic

   —–

   The minority rule gerrymander hack incumbents LOVE making it more difficult to defeat them — i.e. esp. the lower offices – i.e. State Senator, State Rep, etc.

   TOTAL danger now with the COMMUNIST Donkeys and the FASCIST Elephants trying to PERMANENTLY rig elections – stopping Electors from registering and voting, using more and more gerrymanders, etc.

   Result — the TYRANT ravings of Clinton, Sanders, Trump, Cruz, etc.
   ———
   NO primaries, caucuses and conventions.

   General election ballot access ONLY via EQUAL nominating petitions.
   P.R. and nonpartisan App.V.

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