A bill to allow Oregon local governments to use Instant-Runoff Voting for their own elections has been introduced in the State Senate. It is SB 29.
A bill to allow Oregon local governments to use Instant-Runoff Voting for their own elections has been introduced in the State Senate. It is SB 29.
Why is IRV the preferred alternative voting system?
Answer to Ross Levin. It is the liberal notion that since liberals have low vote turn-out compared to Republicans, it is better for them to win an IRV over a run-off. Case in point Saxby Chambliss v. Jim Martin in Georgia. Chambliss won general election by 3 points in Run-off he won by 15 pts. Liberals cant get low income voters to polls on run-offs, so they created a gimmick to undermine the traditional run-off.
Not all traditional run-offs have lower vote turnout than the initial election had. When the first round is on a state’s primary day, and the run-off is on that state’s November election day, the 2nd round turnout is almost always higher. And even in different circumstances sometimes the run-off has a higher turnout. Before San Francisco had IRV, there was a bigger turnout for Mayor in 1999 in the December run-off than there had been in the first round in November. That’s because Tom Ammiano got into the 2nd round via write-in votes in November, making an exciting run-off between him and incumbent Mayor Willie Brown.
You don’t have to be a liberal to support IRV, nor do all liberals support IRV.
The best argument in its favor over regular run-offs is that voters gain the benefits of runoffs (such as majority support for the winner and no “spoiling”) without having to spend millions of taxpayer dollars on extra elections (which may also have dramatically different turnout).
The best argument in its favor over other candidate-ranking schemes (such as approval voting, range voting, Borda court and Condorcet method) is that using IRV, voters’ second or third choices can’t help defeat their first choice. Steven Hill emphasizes this point, and explains it in greater detail, in this recent book review he wrote for American Scientist:
http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/electoral-games-people-play
Answer to Ross:
It provides a runoff, so that candidates must have a majority instead of just a plurality to win. This prevents a spoiler effect, so that voters are more likely to vote for a third party if that is their true preference. You could have a traditional runoff, but that costs more money and time for administrators and voters. (Apparently that point makes that previous poster on this thread cry of a liberal conspiracy). IRV also allows the simultaneous runoff of many candidates instead of just two. For more info, see: http://www.fairvote.org/?page=19
There are a number of reasons why IRV is the most popular alternative to plurality.
-IRV is not a radical change, but more of a reform that corrects the failings of plurality.
-IRV eliminates the need for ‘strategic voting,’ allowing voters to vote for their most-preferred candidate without worrying about helping their least-preferred candidate.
-IRV facilitates majority rule, instead of rule by the largest minority.
-IRV is simple and popular, and has a strong track record in recent years. Passing a more radical reform like proportional representation, or an untested idea like approval voting, would require a lot more convincing of both the public and the powers that be.
So why would IRV be favored over something like approval voting or condorcet voting? Would it be only that IRV has more real world testing (esp. in the US)? And couldn’t someone still play “spoiler” with IRV if they managed to “steal” enough votes from someone that they were kept out of the 2nd or 3rd round?
And congrats on the taking on that new position, Richard.
@6: Proportional representation is a separate issue from IRV, not necessarily opposed to it. A generalized form of IRV known as Single-Transferable Voting (STV) can provide proportional representation in multiple-seat elections. STV is used to elect the city council in my hometown of Cambridge, MA, and was used in a few other US cities during the twentieth century. This page has some information on the specific system Cambridge uses: http://www.cambridgema.gov/election/Proportional_Representation.cfm
@7: As I mentioned in my previous post (#4), systems such as approval voting have the “feature” that voters who express support for their second-favorite candidate(s) undercut their first choices, leading to pressure to bullet-vote and effectively reproduce plurality elections. The link I included discusses this issue (and others) at length. (I hope it is not subscriber-only — if it is, let me know and I’ll work something out.)
To address the second question of whether there could still be spoilers in IRV, keep in mind that only the last-placed candidate in each round is eliminated. It’s an abuse of language, I feel, for a “spoiler” candidate to gain more votes than the candidate they supposedly “spoil”. If you end up in dead last place, you haven’t been “spoiled”, you’ve just plain lost!