Michael Waldman, Executive Director of the Brennan Center, has this article, boosting the National Popular Vote Plan, in Washington Monthly.
Michael Waldman, Executive Director of the Brennan Center, has this article, boosting the National Popular Vote Plan, in Washington Monthly.
Mr Waldman says in his article:
“The delegates referred the mess to the Committee on Detail, which wrote a draft of the Constitution with the Electoral College as a rather convoluted solution. The states would each choose electors, with one electoral vote per senator and House member. That way small states, especially slave states, would have extra clout.”
So here even a supporter of the NPV plan falls prey to the erroneous inference that the Electoral College was contrived to give small states disproportionate power in electing the president. Although the effect is indisputably so, it is wrong to infer the Founding Fathers’ intent was to do so.
The Convention had operated for months with the general consensus that the Executive would be appointed by the Legislative branch of government (although other schemes had been proposed…including appointment by state governors – Yikes!). What scuttled the plan to have the Legislature appoint the President was fear of corruption…”cabal” and “intrigue” as it was popularly called in those days. Dependency by the President for his appointment on another branch of the government would clearly have jeopardized the delicate structure of checks and balances they had endeavored to create throughout the summer. And who knows how corruptable a President might be if his tenure was directly dependent upon members of Congress, perhaps even only 26 Senators?
Well…we do, and they did too.
But let’s let the delegates speak for themselves. When the Committee of Detail returned their work to the Convention for approval on September 4th…
“Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. PINKNEY wished for a particular explanation & discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the Executive.”
“Mr. Govr. MORRIS said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his own. The 1st. was the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointmt. should be made by the Legislature. 2. the inconveniency of an ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so proper for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature, 4. No body had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people. 6. the indispensible necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature. -As the Electors would vote at the same time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of the impeachment.”
“Col: MASON confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose”
“Mr. BUTLER thought the mode not free from objections, but much more so than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail.”
No mention made of protecting small states, “states’ rights”, rural vs. urban, etc. It was all about fear of corruption.
As I’ve stated in this space other times, there is a legitimate argument to be had about whether the disproportionate weight given to small states in deciding the election is proper, fair, desirable. In fact it is also debatable whether small states enjoy any advantages which accrue from directly the Electoral College system here in the 21st century. We should continue those discussions. However, support for EC cannot fairly be augmented by invoking the Founding Father’s “wishes” or intent. The assertion that the Founding Fathers designed the Electoral College specifically or primarily to benefit small states is inferential only, and not at all supported by the overwhelming weight of direct evidence.
All quotes taken from Madison’s notes to the convention. See: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp
OK…Take it Jim.
To update the article:
The National Popular Vote bill now has passed 29 state legislative chambers, in small, medium-small, medium, and large states, including one house in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Oregon, and both houses in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. The bill has been enacted by Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Maryland, and Washington. These five states possess 61 electoral votes — 23% of the 270 necessary to bring the law into effect.
See http://www.NationalPopularVote.com