Georgia Libertarian Party Appeals to Eleventh Circuit in U.S. House Ballot Access Case

On September 25, the Georgia Libertarian Party appealed Cowen v Raffensperger to the Eleventh Circuit. This is the case filed in 2017 over the Georgia ballot access law for minor party and independent candidates for U.S. House. The case had mostly lost, but the Equal Protection part of the case had been still alive until last month., when the U.S. District Court had dismissed it entirely.

Shortly before the U.S. District Court had dismissed the case entirely, the Libertarian Party had informed the judge that this year, the Georgia legislature had changed the law for presidential ballot access. The new law said a minor party can be on for president even if it has no support whatsoever inside Georgia. The new law lets a minor party be on for president automatically in Georgia if it is on for president in at least 20 other jurisdictions.

The party argued that this undercuts the state’s defense of the U.S. House requirement. The state had argued that a state has a compelling interest in keeping candidates off the ballot unless they have overwhelming support, but that argument is contradicted by the new presidential access law. But the U.S. District Court wouldn’t let the party amend its Complaint to make this point, so now the party is appealing to the Eleventh Circuit.


Comments

Georgia Libertarian Party Appeals to Eleventh Circuit in U.S. House Ballot Access Case — 6 Comments

  1. “a state has a compelling interest in keeping candidates off the ballot unless they have overwhelming support”

    This is also contradicted by common sense. “Overwhelming” is such a weasel word here – it can be stretched to mean anything they like. And the only reason candidates without any support whatsoever are kept off the ballot, is to prevent ballot crowding confusing voters. And even that is already controversial, given that there is no agreement about when ballots become crowded, or whether crowded ballots confuse voters.

  2. VOID FOR VAGUENESS — ADJECTIVES / ADVERBS

    U.S. v Davis, 588 US _ (24 June 2019). [SPACING ADDED]

    Slip op p. 4
    II
    Our doctrine prohibiting the enforcement of vague laws rests on the twin constitutional pillars of due process and separation of powers. See Dimaya, 584 U. S., at ___–___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 4–5); id., at ___–___
    Slip op p. 5
    (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2–9).

    Vague laws contravene the “first essential of due process of law” that statutes must give people “of common intelligence” fair notice of what the law demands of them. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926); see Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634, 638 (1914).

    Vague laws also undermine the Constitution’s separation of powers and the democratic self-governance it aims to protect.

    Only the people’s elected representatives in the legislature are authorized to “make an act a crime.” United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812).

    Vague statutes threaten to hand responsibility for defining crimes to relatively unaccountable police, prosecutors, and judges, eroding the people’s ability to oversee the creation of the laws they are expected to abide. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357–358, and n. 7 (1983); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 89–91 (1921); United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1876).

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