Although it is a matter of opinion, and there are probably many contrary opinions, my opinion is that progress for the National Popular Vote Plan is good for minor parties and independent presidential candidates. My opinion is based on the idea that if the National Popular Vote Plan got quite close to being implemented, the various state legislatures would mostly then be willing to pass a constitutional amendment to eliminate the electoral college. And that amendment would also bring about congressional authority to write one ballot access law for presidential elections. For example, U.S. Senator Bill Nelson’s pending constitutional amendment specifically authorizes Congress to do this.
I believe that a single ballot access procedure for presidential elections for the entire nation would be an improvement over the existing system. Minor parties and independent presidential candidates would no longer be at the mercy of states like Oklahoma, North Carolina, Georgia, and Indiana, states which are so severe for ballot access that Ralph Nader has never managed to appear on the ballot in those states, even though he is the person who came in third in 2000, 2004, and 2008.
Well, I am a third-party activist in North Carolina, specifically Libertarian. However, I oppose the National Popular Vote plan exactly for the same reason you support it: it would lead to the elimination of the Electoral College, at least in any meaningful sense. It is one of the few remaining foundations of federalism. Removal of the Electoral College would be more step to a unitary national government, which would be a much bigger threat to personal liberty. The cost to liberty far outweighs the benefit to alternative political parties.
I believe that the NPV would advance the cause of third parties for two reasons.
First, the “bar” for getting EC votes would be lowered from roughly 45-48% to 35-38%. That would make campaign funding more likely for third party candidates.
Second, opening up the presidential campaign to voters who are currently effectively disenfranchised in solid “red” and “blue” states would bring hundreds of thousands of new voters to the polls, many of whom are quite disenchanted by the current electoral process. They don’t bother to go to the polls because they know for a fact what presidential candidate is going to win in their state(s). Once attracted to the polls, wouldn’t these people, who were once willing not to vote at all because of unhappiness with “politics as usual” be more likely to vote for third party candidates at the state and local level? I think so. And if third parties are ever to be successful, particularly at the top the ticket in this country, I think they first need to achieve a foothold in state legislatures and statehouses.
I also believe the NPV will lessen the opportunity to commit electoral fraud by either major party. As I’ve stated before, as polling science has become more and more exact, it is now easy to identify the two or three states which will swing a presidential election. If those states are firmly in control of one or the other major party, you have a chance to get something like Ohio in 2004, where the electoral college votes of a state were basically stolen by widespread, systemic and highly organized electoral fraud. And before you point a finger at me…no, I’m not a Democrat, and yes, it could just have easily been the Dems who perpetrated the fraud if they had held the governorship and Sec’y of State in Ohio.
It would be much harder to nationalize electoral fraud than it is now to manage it at local levels.
Thanks.
Personally I think that the electoral college is extreme, but I think that going just popular vote would be the other extreme as well. If each state enacted law that was the same as Nebraska and Maine, we’d have a system that is at the center between the two extremes. This would also be easier to enact since the states alone would have to pass it, instead of the long constitutional amendment process. This would be better because it would be more proportional to the voters within the state’s districts and it would represent the state as a whole by giving two votes to the winner.
this bad idea would put the final nail in the coffin of the founding principals of this country – a union of states – it would gut what little power is left in the state and local governments and empower the Federal government to grab even more control than they all ready have. This could also hurt third parties that have a strong state or regional base that might dead lock the electorial college. Also Candidates for president would totally ignore us in fly over country then.
First off, with Congress specifying the requirements for a Presidential candidate it now grants them the capacity to essentially make sure that there will ONLY be two candidates for President. After all, both of the major parties prefer having 2 candidate elections. Look at all the fuss raised with Nader’s 2000 Campaign by the cry babies in the Democratic party.
Second, Should they actually permit other “National” candidates it won’t matter much unless they can also participate in ALL of the Fall debates with the major candidates. I can imagine Congress using the campaign finance laws to generate all sorts of mischief for the other candidates in regards to filing/reporting on their campaigns.
Third, isn’t the basic concept of the National Vote Plan unconstitutional because you now have states entering into a “Conmpact” which as I read the Federal Constitution is prohibited without the approval of Congress? After all, Seven Southwest states needed the approval of Congress back in the 1920’s to establish the Colorado River Compact to share the annual flow of the Colorado River amongst themselves and Mexico.
I agree with Richard about the value of a uniform ballot access law. But I don’t think that’s the most important effect of NPV on small parties.
The more important question is whether it would lead to a majority rule voting procedure — IRV or at the very least top two runoff. The argument that it would is based on the idea that it will never be possible to change Presidential elections by constitutional amendment, and that an interstate compact would break this long-standing constitutional logjam. The argument that it wouldn’t is that, having won a nationwide plurality vote, further reform would be blocked by the idea that the main problem had been solved. I’ve been on the fence about this since the NPV campaign first started.
Aside to Baronscarpia: a single, nationwide plurality vote would not lower the bar to election or encourage voters to support candidates other than the top two. Both experience and political science theory show the exact opposite.
In short, if NPV turns out to be the end of the road, it will be bad for small parties. If it turns out to facilitate the adoption of majority-rule runoffs, it will be good.
Deemer, the courts have ruled that Congressional consent to an interstate compact can be passive and implicit. In the absence of explicit Congressional action, a compact would be valid in this respect. Further, NPV advocates believe that Congress may vote to have the District of Columbia join the compact. That would clearly solve this problem.
The real constitutional issue is whether the interstate compact mechanism can be used for this purpose, which depends on whether the purpose is constitutional. In my opinion, this is the kind of court case in which the political views of the judges have a big impact on the outcome. Whether NPV is (ruled to be) constitutional is going to depend on who is sitting on the bench at the time it’s decided.
A successful challenge to the National Popular Vote compact on constitutional grounds seems highly unlikely, given the fact that constitutional law concerning interstate compacts is well settled and the fact that the National Popular Vote compact is based on the plenary and exclusive power of the states to award their electoral votes.
NPV is not aware of a case in which the courts have ever invalidated any interstate compact. Given recent tendencies of the courts to accord increased deference to state’s rights (and, in particular, recent judicial support for even freer use of interstate compacts by the states), it seems highly unlikely that the courts would invalidate the National Popular Vote compact. The National Popular Vote compact is an example of state’s rights in action.
Second, there are no restrictions in the U.S. Constitution on the subject matter of interstate compacts, other than the implicit limitation that the compact’s subject matter must be among the powers that the states are permitted to exercise.
Federalism concerns the allocation of power between state governments and the national government. The National Popular Vote bill concerns how votes are tallied, not how much power state governments possess relative to the national government. The powers of state governments are neither increased nor decreased based on whether presidential electors are selected along the state boundary lines, along district lines (as is currently the case in Maine and Nebraska), or national lines.
The congressional district method of awarding electoral votes (currently used in Maine and Nebraska) would not help make every vote matter. In NC, for example, there are only 4 of the 13 congressional districts that would be close enough to get any attention. A smaller fraction of the county’s population lives in competitive congressional districts (about 12%) than in the current battleground states (about 30%). Also, a second-place candidate could still win the White House without winning the national popular vote.
The Electoral College is not “Federalism”. It is an ancient anti-democratic left over from days when kings ruled every nations.
#1 – Institute popular vote for the President.
#2 – Proportional representation for an expanded 1,000 member House of Reps.
Virtually every democratic nation in the world has some form of proportional representation. Because of single member winner-shaft-all districts we have not seated a 3rd party in the House since 1948. That is obscene.
The normal way of changing the method of electing the President is not a federal constitutional amendment, but changes in state law. The U.S. Constitution gives “exclusive” and “plenary” control to the states over the appointment of presidential electors.
Historically, virtually all of the previous major changes in the method of electing the President have come about by state legislative action. For example, the people had no vote for President in most states in the nation’s first election in 1789. However, nowadays, as a result of changes in the state laws governing the appointment of presidential electors, the people have the right to vote for presidential electors in 100% of the states.
In 1789, only 3 states used the winner-take-all rule (awarding all of a state’s electoral vote to the candidate who gets the most votes in the state). However, as a result of changes in state laws, the winner-take-all rule is now currently used by 48 of the 50 states.
In other words, neither of the two most important features of the current system of electing the President (namely, that the voters may vote and the winner-take-all rule) are in the U.S. Constitution. Neither was the choice of the Founders when they went back to their states to organize the nation’s first presidential election.
The 10th amendment is the bulwark of federalism in the U.S., and abolishing the electoral college would have no effect on the 10th amendment.
The office of President of the United States has existed since 1789. By whatever mechanism the President has been elected under our Constitution, the key point is that the whole country chooses the President. No single state chooses the President. It isn’t as though we had a Constitution that says each state in its turn should be permitted to choose the President, on a rotating basis. All presidential elections involve the entire nation. The method by which we choose that one President is not a states rights matter. No one state has the right to choose a President all by itself. The entire nation does it.
First, if it were not for the electoral college, then in 2000 we would not have been looking at each vote over and over in four Florida counties. We would have been going over every vote, in every precinct, in every county, in every state! Second, if the election for president becomes in effect “winner take all”, the minor and third parties are going to say, “why bother?”, and call it a day. All except perhaps the big three, Libertarian, Constitution, and Green.
NPV blatantly violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amdt. — by having votes outside of a State determine results inside a State.
What is to stop a State from having FOREIGN persons (or even aliens from outer space) vote for Prez if IRV takes effect ???
Proper amdt –
Uniform definition of Elector in ALL of the U.S.A.
NONPARTISAN nominations and elections of all elected executive officers and all judges using Approval Voting.
P.R. for ALL legislative body elections.
NPV: Another argument for secession.
In 2000 there wouldn’t have been a recount, if we had a direct popular vote. Al Gore’s margin of 537,179 votes over George Bush was more than one-half of 1% of the total vote cast in 2000. Statistics can demonstrate that a margin that big, in an election with that many voters, has a vanishingly small chance of being altered by a recount. Recounts typically change fewer votes than one-tenth of 1% of the total vote cast, especially in elections with a very large number of votes.
#3 –
CD allocation of EC votes, which is perfectly constitutional, would do nothing to settle the problems with the current EC system. Instead of a few “swing” states deciding the election for the rest of us, it would be 30 to 40 CD’s. And in that scenario, you can bet that the kind of fraud we saw in Ohio in 2004 would be rampant throughout the country.
#4 – When has a third party candidate in recent history deadlocked the EC count?
#5 – The NPV compact says and would do nothing about determining qualification for ballots. Some in this space see that as a negative about the compact. Perhaps. However, the more problems one compact is designed to solve, the less likely it is to pass and resolve any of them. Ballot access, voter qualifications, uniform ballots, etc. are all issues worth resolution, but by some other means if the consequence would otherwise be to keep intact this insane method of electing a president.
#6 – Please cite any political science which leads to the conclusion that election by plurality of the popular vote would not enhance the viability of third party candidates. Absent any hard facts, the assertion flies in the face of logic and simple math.
#7 – As to the constitutionality of the NPV, the USSC would have to go far afield of a strict constructionist interpretation of the wording of the constitution which empowers individual state legislatures to allocate EC votes in a “in such manner as may thereof direct.” Further, the court has already held in Virginia vs. Tennessee in 1893 that a compact need not even be approved by Congress, as specified by the Constitution, unless the compact has the effect of giving to the states powers superior to that of the federal government. This is settled law. Not that the USSC isn’t above ignoring stare decisis now and again, but the fact is there is nothing unconstitutional about the NPV compact.
I think it’s fascinating that a central argument against the NPV is that it would diminish “states’ rights” when in fact the NPV is nothing more than an assertion of a right by individual states, specifically granted to them by the Constitution. Under the current system, if there are indeed any special benefits to be derived by individual states, they would accrue only to the “swing” states du jour. And what are those “rights,” anyway? Be specific. Do the opponents of the NPV compact who supposedly cherish states rights care only about the rights of those swing states? What about the DOZENS of states which have not been in play for decades and don’t ever see a presidential candidate after the primaries are over? What about their “rights?” And what about the rights of individual Republicans in RI, MA, CT, VT, etc.? Do opponents of the NPV compact give a damn that they might just as well go to the dump on election day and leavetheir ballot there than trudge to the polls and vote for a candidate who they KNOW will lose their state’s EC votes? Where is the concern for those voters’ rights? Why spend a minute trying to reform voter qualification processes, ballot access, etc. when the reforms would be applied to a tallying process that is left to systematically disenfranchise millions of voters?
#16 – If you want to secede, please do. Quickly.
#18: Please cite any political science which leads to the conclusion that election by plurality of the popular vote would not enhance the viability of third party candidates. Absent any hard facts, the assertion flies in the face of logic and simple math.
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (Wiley, 1954).
Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count (Cambridge UP, 1997).
Rein Taagepera & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats & Votes (Yale UP, 1989).
… and on and on and on …
#12 Most presidential electors in 1789 were either chosen directly by the voters, or where they had an significant role (eg in Massachusetts, each district nominated two persons, from which the legislature chose one to be the elector). In the states most associated with the Founding Fathers, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the electors were chosen based on popular votes.
A large share of Constitutional Amendments, post Bill of Rights have dealt with the election of the President.
12th (separate electoral votes for President and Vice President)
13th and 14th (apportionment of electoral votes)
20th (terms of Congress and President, eliminated election by lame duck House)
22nd (term limits on President)
23rd (presidential vote for District of Columbia)
24th (barring poll tax in presidential elections)
25th (presidential succession)
The proper place for defining the fundamental organization of a government is in its constitution.
#13 National popular vote is likely to lead to national voter registration and control of presidential and congressional elections and further overawing of state and local elections and officials. It would simply hasten the creation of a de facto unitary national state.
#17 We don’t know what the results in 2000 would have been under NPV. Nader would likely have picked up votes in North Carolina and Oregon; and would have been less likely to have been squeezed in places like Oregon.
While the statewide election was close, only 10 of 67 counties were even within 5%, only one was within 1%. Even in numeric terms, only 7 counties were closer, and that was primarily due to the size of their electorate (collectively a bit over 1% of the State). For example, a 300 vote Bush plurality in Liberty County amounted to 12.45%.
There was a reason that Gore’s handlers had him ask for recounts in Volusia, Broward, Palm Beach, and Dade counties. Those were all counties he carried, and if loose chads are random, they would likely favor him.
The Florida election in 2000 looked remarkably similar to the USA election in 1880, razor thin sharp nationally but with huge margins piled up in individual states.
#18 Richard Winger’s argument was that passage of the NPV scheme would inextricably lead to passage of a constitutional amendment.
Don’t you find it more than fascinating that those who profess to celebrate the exclusive and plenary authority of States to independently to determine the manner in which they appoint their electors would support a scheme that would inevitably lead to forfeiture of that authority.
Libertarians love to toss the word “liberty” around, to the point where they’re hardly making any sense. What precisely is “the cost to liberty” of eliminating the Electoral College? A guy coming in second in terms of the number of votes cast by individuals (the people on whose behalf Libertarians advocate so fiercely) becoming the guy who wins the election and takes office — what does that have to do with liberty?
What kind of “liberty” do voters in states like Oklahoma, Utah, Massachusetts, Vermont, etc. have where the electoral vote outcome is settled in advance? Their votes for president are meaningless. But they have electoral “liberty.”
Freeing up ballot access by eliminating these cockamamey, excessive, and wildly varying petition requirements from state to state for THE SAME OFFICE and substituting a national standard – I suppose that’s less desirable than allowing every jurisidiction to set its own ballot access requirements. Why stop at the state level? Let’s allow counties, cities, and towns all across the country to set whatever petition requirements they want for presidential candidates. Now there’s liberty for you.
#24 –
It’s not a forfeiture of authority at all. Rather, states would simply opt for a different means of exerting it, using the power of “choice” that the Constitution explicitly grants to them.
It’s not a particularly fine point. You’re clearly too smart not to understand it. So what really is the axe you’re grinding here?
#19 –
Interesting. Thank you.
I strongly support Chris’ opinion on any attempts to eliminate the Electoral College. Such an idea as NVP would effectively set the stage for the creation of a unitary national state, with the individual states reduced to nothing more than administrative districts—ala Germany under the National Socialists.
#26 I think it is you that are missing the point.
You argue the “plenary and exclusive” right of States to determine the manner in which States determine the manner in which they appoint their electors as if you were channeling Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Anderson v. Celebrezze.
Yet you ignore that John Anderson is a highlighted adviser to those promoting the NPV scheme.
And you ignore that if the NPV scheme goes into effect, that it will quite likely lead to passage of a consitutional amendment that will completely obliterate the plenary and exclusive power that the States now exercise, and that the manner in which Congress then implements presidential elections is likely to encroach on the manner in which States conduct all elections, and seriously erode the federal system, and even the distribution of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.
True individual lemmings may choose to run towards the cliff or not, but the net effect is still that they all jump over.
#18: We all secede eventually don’t we?
Until reforms that that make rigging elections extremely difficult are in place, NPV would make little difference in breaking the two-party hegemony. I recommend the documentary Uncounted:The New Math of American Elections. The first order of business is to assure an honest count.
The place to begin is to make ballot counting public at the level where the votes are cast.
Before the public counting begins each and every ballot should be scanned and the ballot images posted to the Web for all to see. Then the count should be conducted at the polling place in completely open view of observers. Observers would be any adult person who shows up to watch. If ‘too many’ people want to watch, then not more than fifty observers would be selected by lot from among those present. Video recording of the counting by observers should not be obstructed.
The tally of the vote should be immediately posted at the polling place where the count takes place and also posted to the Web.
The tallied ballots should then be sealed in locked boxes requiring the keys of three people to open – two precinct officials and one observer selected by lot. The ballot boxes should then be stored in a warehouse which is open to inspection by any of the elections observers and security cameras of the stored boxes should be streamed on the web around the clock pending resolution of any election disputes and appeals.
These are only the highlights of how integrity in elections could be established. Only with such safeguards in place, can one consider other electoral reforms.
I’m not going to argue the pros and cons of NPV or the effects on federalism, but I don’t think this plan in itself is helpful to 3rd parties. In our current system it actually takes about 12% of the vote to get a majority of electoral votes. Now this would require a huge amount of luck and a very focused strategy in the appropriate states, but there’s the bar. This plan would raise the bar to about 34%. Since 1912, no 3rd party or independent candidate has cracked 20% of the popular vote (the wealthy Ross Perot coming the closest). Political parties have come and gone in our nation’s history, but rarely have more than two parties been viable at the same time.
And it’s not the electoral college that keeps down 3rd parties, through disenfranchisement by winner-take-all apportionment, it’s plurality voting. By voting honestly, rather than strategically, 3rd parties and 3rd party voters sometimes cause the worst of the top two to get elected. You hear it all the time. How many people actually vote FOR a candidate these days?
In reality this plan does nothing to make it easier for a 3rd party to get into the White House. Uniform and/or reduced ballot access requirements, campaign finance reform (less paperwork, not more), better news coverage, voting system reform (e.g. IRV), attendance in national debates, and changing voter mindset in general are the only things that will open up the field to have more than two viable parties. I see nothing about this plan that will guarantee or provide for these changes.