On November 5, the Libertarian National Committee filed this reply brief in Libertarian National Committee v Federal Election Commission, 19-234. This is the case over whether the Constitution permits the FEC to prevent parties from receiving large bequests when the estate is probated, so that the party must wait to receive the money over a period of years.
The Court has put this case on its November 22 conference.
The mess is one more attack by the Feds on the 10 Amdt among other things.
How useless are ALL Con Law profs in ALL State law skooools ??? –
watching the Fed hacks destroy the States since 1789.
Non-morons — read the Federalist about 3 times and detect the very LIMITED powers of the USA regime – esp in peacetime.
NONSTOP subversion of the States since Oct 1929 – Great Depression I [due to the UNCON Fed Res Bank system — rigging of paper money supply and interest rates]
The Federalist is not binding. You don’t need to read that. I would recommend reading books by Erwin Chemerinsky.
Sorry – The Federalist was THE major work in 1787-1788 to get the Art. VII State conventions to ratify the 1787 USA Const.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Federalist_Papers
Federalist has been cited by SCOTUS numerous times.
Lots of EVIL rotted so-called lawyers brain washed in early law skoool classes that the States and the 10 Amdt mean zero — esp since 1929-1936 – Phase A of 1929-1941 Great Depression I.
see also
Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/489/214/
Eu above link
c
The Federalist aint binding. it is
seen as persuasive
SCOTUS ops definitely aint binding —
subject more and more often of being OVER-ruled.
See Const Anno. appendix list.
—
Advanced students with LOTS of time –
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution by the State Ratifying Conventions
will need a mega-computerized index of ALL volumes — so SCOTUS can attempt to have much better *nonpartisan* ops.
The UN Charter, baby! THAT’S the real deal!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Left page numbers in The Federalist edited by Jacob E. Cooke (1961) (Fed. Number-Paragraph)
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federali.txt
*******
A. Limited U.S.A. Government Powers – in General
NOT brought up in hundreds of cases.
86 14-8
In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity.
105 17-1
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national government.
197-198 31-11 (part)
*** The State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. ***
199 32-2
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States.
203 32-5
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such provisions. ***
more later.
256 39-14
But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. ***
262 40-9 (part)
*** We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.
262 40-10 (part)
The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. ***
309 45-3
Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.
310 45-4 (part)
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. ***
313 45-9
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
313 45-10
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the particular States.
553 82-3 (part)
The principles established in a former paper [No. 31.] teach us that the States will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the federal head; and that this exclusive delegation can only exist in one of three cases: where an exclusive authority is, in express terms, granted to the Union; or where a particular authority is granted to the Union, and the exercise of a like authority is prohibited to the States; or where an authority is granted to the Union, with which a similar authority in the States would be utterly incompatible. ***
@DR,
Congress has the authority to regulate congressional elections.
JR-
due to SPECIFIC language in 1-4
Even SCOTUS hacks have noted Fed 45-9 —
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.
Look up on the internet of SCOTUS ops.
The destruction of the States has mostly been via perversions of the general welfare [since 1936] and commerce among the States in I-8 [since 1865].
Hard working students can look up such subjects in the Federalist – in connection with above the LIMITED USA Powers above.
if something is in probate, isnt unfair to say that a political party can get it now, but everyone else has to wait?