Missouri Bill to Put Presidential Elector Law Into State Constitution

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Missouri Representative John Simmons (R-Krakow) has introduced HJR 52. It would amend the state constitution to provide that the current law on how Missouri voters choose presidential electors would be part of the state constitution. If the legislature passes this bill, then the voters would vote on the idea in 2022. Thanks to Ken Bush for this news.

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Missouri Bill to Put Presidential Elector Law Into State Constitution — 70 Comments

  3. The BAN troll moron continues.
    —–
    EC – 1 of the 3 USA ANTI-Democracy gerrymander systems –

    H Reps, Senate, EC.
    —–
    PR and AppV
    TOTSOP

  4. The US is a constitutional republic, not a democracy. You really are a stupid retard.

  6. @“Demo Rep is a retard” A republic is a representative democracy fucktard. How are representatives elected? Democratically. What procedure do the representative engage in to pass laws? Democracy (pretty sure they need a majority of representatives to vote yes or did I miss something – democracy is nothing more than a majority of individuals voting for something). The only difference is that there are representatives instead of a straight popular vote on everything that occurs.

    I know every time I see somebody engage in this “ The US is a constitutional republic, not a democracy” idiocy that they’re a retarded brain dead genuinely uneducated ignorant moron of some social conservative persuasion, who has no grasp on the understanding of political systems or political ideologies. All democrats are socialists too right?

    PS The EC has nothing to do with protecting smaller states, as there are an equal number of small states that vote Republican and Democratic. And it has nothing to do with protecting rural areas from cities as electors are awarded statewide, and thus city populations still have a disproportionate influence on the state winner. Texas, Tennessee, Georgia, and Arizona are becoming blue because their city populations are increasing and their rural populations are staying stagnant. And that is largely because millennials (like myself) and gen z reject social conservativism; and we’re not voting Democratic because of their economics, in fact most of us hate their economic policies, we just hate social conservatism even more (not to mention Republicans now actively engage in manipulation of markets and favor the welfare state too – where did privatizing social security and leaving businesses alone (anti-trust lawsuits against google) go? Plus economic protectionism used to be solely a Democratic position). I vote Libertarian or Democratic as a fall back if there is no Libertarian, so that way I get at least some degree of the civil liberalism I’m after.

  10. ALL rotted regimes in the USA since 1964 —

    1/2 or less votes x 1/2 gerrymander areas
    = 1/4 or less CONTROL
    = oligarchs in CONTROL
    >>> de facto Monarchs
    — USA REGIME H Reps Speaker – Senate MAJORITY LEADER – PREZ.

    1776-1964 MUCH WORSE ROT- ABOUT 5-15 PCT CONTROL BY 1963 IN EACH STATE REGIME.
    ———
    PR AND APPV
    TOTSOP

  13. “Retard” IS a retard and maybe a wingnut as well as a troll for spouting this “constitutional republic” stuff.

  14. It’s Don Williams. I’m not Trump, who is far as I know doesn’t go by Don, and never heard of this Cody, or the other two Dons you mentioned. My question was for Demo Rep. I was wondering what changed in 1964.

  15. Also as the father of a wonderful special needs daughter I’m asking nicely to please stop using “retard” as your go to pejorative, or really at all. I know it’s common but you’re really insulting yourself when you use that word as well as some really great people you should get to know better. Thanks .

  17. I like the Electoral College because it allows each state to use whatever voting method they prefer. They don’t ALL have to use plurality, winner-take-all voting. Some states are starting to realize this. Without the electoral college all the states would be compelled to use the same voting method.

    We could improve the Electoral College by 1. adopting the Wyoming Rule to apportion the House of Representatives, and 2. dividing more populous states into new states. These changes would have the effect of making the Electoral College more representative of the voting population.

  18. Different Don Williams. I don’t sing, am not famous, and don’t use social media so you won’t find anything.

  21. 1964- 2 SCOTUS GERRYMANDER CASES- USA REPS AND STATE LEGIS —
    BOTH SCREWED UP.

    VOTERS VOTE — NOT CENSUS POPULATIONS – ESP. NOT CHILDREN AND LEGAL/ILLEGAL FOREIGN FOLKS.

    SOME RESULTS – URBAN RIOTS, VIETNAM WAR, MAJOR 1965-1982 INFLATION [ DESTRUCTION OF $$$ paper savings of lower/middle classes), USA BANKRUPTCY 1965-2021, GERRYMANDER COMMS (FULL OF LIARS / UNDERCOVER HACKS).
    ——–
    PR AND APPV
    TOTSOP

  26. FC, sorry, despite the name coincidence, not my era nor my kind of music.

    Demo rep, interesting…I’ve never heard anyone claim that 1964 supreme court gerrymandering cases were some sort of seminal moment.

    Rick, what’s your term for someone with an abnormal lack of compassion? That goes for the rest of you slinging that term around.

  28. For UNAWARE folks — too many on this BAN list to count —

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering

    About 95 pct predictable gerrymander winners – esp for USA Reps, State/Local legis.

    D/R gerrymander gangs will try for 100 pct known-in-advance winners in 2021-2031 = total fraud / rigged elections.
    ———
    PR and APPV
    TOTSOP

  30. USA Senate — semi-permanent gerrymander areas –

    AT Moment ———
    22 States 2 D
    22 States 2 R
    6 States split 1 D + 1 R
    —
    50 States – 50 D + 50 R — VP D
    —
    Abolish the really evil ANTI-Democracy Minority Rule 666 USA Senate and the EC.
    —-
    PR and APPV
    TOTSOP

  32. FC I don’t claim to be a grammar expert, even if I was, I’m not really trying to edit the comments for grammar. Maybe speaking of conspiracy theories, you have one, but I don’t even understand what its supposed to be. Sadly no one has even attempted, to answer my last question. What’s your term for someone with an unusual lack of compassion, or empathy? There may be a few of you here, between your favorite insult, your conspiracy theories, your obscure fixations, ect. There should be a word for that, or maybe there is one already?

  33. Every time you use the hateful term, “retard” I care less about the argument that you you are trying to make.

  34. Better to be an alleged polisci retard than a known certified troll MORON.
    —–
    End ALL the monarch/oligarch R-O-T.
    PR and AppV
    TOTSOP

  35. Possible substitutes to use for retard or retarded:

    Down syndrome sufferer, mongoloid, pinhead, knobhead, slow adult, mentally challenged/handicapped/disabled, intellectually challenged/handicapped/disabled

    Any others?

  36. Some New Age list of **politically IN-correct*** list of words/phrases

    — to be purged O-U-T of dictionaries — esp RED Donkey communist dictionaries ???

    1. Purge the words/phrases.
    2. + Purge A-L-L users of the purged words/phrases.
    3. = RED Donkey communist utopia — at least for language.

  37. I see noone even tried, to answer my question. Tom Jefferson would be right if these people were actually trying to make any kind of argument. I don’t see them trying to make one do you?

  42. I oppose this proposed amendment because it may ban ranked choice voting in that state’s presidential elections.

  43. Our constitution established an elective majoritarian rule republic. Not a republic that would be exclusively dominated and ruled by minority interests.
    Of the people, by the people, and for the the people espouses a democratic ideal. The intent was elective representation and rule by common sense majorities.
    Our founding fathers placed a lot of faith in the common sense of the people as a whole, or in other words majority consensus rule as expressed through their elected representatives. MAJORITY RULE NOT MINORITY RULE.
    That fundamental principle has been under assault by the Republican party since Reagan was elected. The only way the current radical extremist republican party can win any national majority is by suppressing majority voting rights through dirty political tactics: gerrymandering, illegal voter purges, precinct access manipulation, and electronic voting machine fraud among 60 other tactics.

  44. There is nothing in the Constitution about majority rule. The whole sense of the Constitution is about consensus buildling. This is Madison’s whole point in Federalist #10. The intent is to prevent any one person or party from having complete control of the government. That’s the purpose behind divided sovereignty, separation of powers, checks and balances, and bicameralism.

  45. WZ—

    TOTAL FAILURE of the 1776-1787 oligarchs — who copied much of the Brit ROT into the State and USA Consts.

    Nonstop brainwashing of the public about the ANTI-Democracy minority rule gerrymanders in ALL States and the 3 USA gerrymander systems.

    USA has been a Prez monarchy since 1861-1917-1933-1942-1950 [pick a year] —

    Prez budget- Prez veto- Prez exec hacks (esp USA Marshals and USA DAs)- Prez SCOTUS hacks.
    ———
    Abolish USA Senate and EC
    PR and APPV
    TOTSOP

  46. Demo Rep

    No brainwashing is needed. There was no original intent for majoritarian democracy. The constitutional system was intentionally based on requiring the consensus of several different constituencies before any changes could be made. The system has worked as intended, much to the frustration of eager “activists” on both the left and right.

  47. 4-4 Republican Form of Govt = Majority rule Democracies in Each State.

    >>>>> NOOOOO minority rule monarch / oligarch regime in any State — as in most of Europe in 1787.

    NEW Order of the Ages.
    —-
    Consensus = MINORITY RULE stopping of ANY changes.

    See 750,000 DEAD in 1861-1866- the *consensus* cost to get the 13-14-15 Amdts.

    Too many folks brain dead about 6 Jan 2021 attack on USA Capitol.
    —–
    PR = majority rule — to END having minority rule gerrymanders in the USA Congress, ALL State legis. and many local regimes.

    Nonpartisan APPV — to END having partisan HACK execs/judics.

    TOTSOP — to END having lawless tyrants – esp top execs – Prezs, Guvs, Mayors.

  48. @ Demo Rep:

    Republican form of government means no hereditary monarchs or aristocrats.

    The Civil War happened because the South resisted the growing consensus to ban slavery in the territories, and not admit any more slave states. The Republicans didn’t advocate abolition in 1860, not even Lincoln. They just didn’t want any more slave states.

    And, to add insult to injury, the Southern states chose to secede unilaterally. No negotiation on secession terms, like Brexit.

  51. Separate NOOOO titles of nobility in 1-9-8 and 1-10-1.

    NOOO State confederations in 1-10-1.

  54. ALL of the State/local gerrymander cases since 1964 have been Republican Form of Government cases

    – regardless of SCOTUS which is brain dead ignorant / clueless about the RFG related language shown below – See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 183-185 (1992).

    *******
    Federalist — Republican Form of Government – Majority Rule 20 Aug 2011

    Federalist, 1787-1788 — Left page number from The Federalist edited by Jacob E. Cooke (1961) — (Number-Paragraph)

    http://www.constitution.org/fed/federali.txt

    emphasis added

    57 10-2 By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

    60 10-11 If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.

    61 10-12 By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.

    61 10-13 From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.

    62 10-14 A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

    62 10-15 The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

    63 10-20 The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

  55. The garbage comment on March 1, 2021 at 5:49 pm is from Robert K Stock.

  56. 83 14-2 The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.

    84 14-4 Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle.

    130 21-3 The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.

    130 21-4 Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts [1786 Shay’s Rebellion] has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?

    131 21-5 The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.

  57. 138 22-7 The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Delaware an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America; [3] and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.

    [Gee – see Art. I, Sec. 3 and the later 17th Amdt].

    140 22-9 But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in some way or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy.

    251 39-3 If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.

  58. 254 39-11 That it [Constitution taking effect] will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.

    257 39-15 If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

    291 43-13 6. “To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.”
    [[partial misquote — U.S.A. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.]]

    [[Gee – are the Federal courts (including SCOTUS) part of the *United States* ???]]

    291 43-14 In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. “As the confederate republic of Germany,” says Montesquieu, “consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland.” “Greece was undone,” he adds, “as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons.” In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.

    [How many aristocratic or monarchial gerrymander persons in each State legislature or local legislative body since 4 July 1776 ???]

  59. 293 43-17 At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other.

    350 51-9 First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

    351 51-10 Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority — that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.

    384 57-3 The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people.

  60. 507 75-6 The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is that which would substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the members composing the senatorial body, to that of two thirds of the members present. It has been shown, under the second head of our inquiries, that all provisions which require more than the majority of any body to its resolutions, have a direct tendency to embarrass the operations of the government, and an indirect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority. ***

    577 84-5 It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon the whole, of equal importance with any which are to be found in the constitution of this State. The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, and of TITLES OF NOBILITY, to which we have no corresponding provision in our Constitution, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any it contains. ***

    577 84-6 Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.

    588 85-3 The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.

  61. You will note any fraudulent appropriation of the “Fact checker” name like Cody Quirk’s comment on March 1, 2021 at 5:52 pm does not use my gravatar and so is not genuine.

  63. The retards on this list are the brain dead MORONS ignorant about USA political history

    — among many other things

    — fine examples of modern skooool grad-u-8s

    — promoted no matter how stupid.
    —–
    PR and APPV
    TOTSOP

  64. Demo Rep, maybe you’ll give it a shot since no one else has, what’s your preferred term for someone with an unusually low level of compassion or empathy?

  65. Demo Rep is obviously triggered when somebody truthfully calls him a retard. Imagine him in real life.

  66. Wow Cody. You think you can stop using these made up names to throw around the retard term which is offensive to Don Williams (not the deceased country music star) because of his daughter?

    If you actually read what Demo Rep wrote maybe you’d learn something for once in your life.

  67. Retard offensive? Grow a spine, SJW baby. Demo Rep is a retard, plain and simple.

  68. It’s not offensive, it just shows your character. As does, not answering my question.

  69. Don asks – what’s your preferred term for someone with an unusually low level of compassion or empathy?
    —
    Answer — A New Age statist — commie/fascist versions.

    see ALL gerrymander HACK incumbents — Fed/states/locals.

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