Moritz College of Law Professor Dale A. Oesterle has this interesting commentary on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Doe v Reed.  Oesterle does not so much take sides in the case, as to point out the unclear legal standards set forth in the decision.  Doe v Reed is the case from Washington state on whether governments should release the names and addresses of petition signers to the public.

Among the unanswered questions, according to Oesterle, is whether the principles set forth in the case apply to petitions other than referendum petitions.  He is especially curious about whether the analysis would apply to recall petitions.  Recall petitions, more than any other petitions with legal affect, are closest to voting, and the nation has a strong tradition for the last 120 years that voting should be secret.

As Oesterle notes, the case is not finished, and now returns to U.S. District Court in Washington to decide if names and addresses from the particular referendum petition that caused the case should be released to the public.

The Socialist Workers Party has released a list of its candidates for public office this year.  The party expects to be on the statewide ballot in Iowa.  It also expects to be on the ballot for one U.S. House race in New York, and one in Iowa.  Finally, it expects to be on the ballot for Mayor of Washington, D.C.  All the other candidates will be write-in candidates.

The Texas election law says corporations may donate money to political parties “to defray normal overhead and administrative or operating costs incurred by the party; or to administer a primary election or convention held by the party.”

In 2006, the Democratic Party nominee for Governor of Texas polled less than 30% of the total vote cast.  The Texas election law actually says that parties should be on the ballot automatically if they either got 2% for Governor at the last gubernatorial election, or 5% for any statewide race at the last election.  But imagine if the Texas election law said parties are only on the ballot automatically if they got 30% for Governor at the last gubernatorial election.

Under this imaginary scenario, the Democratic Party would have needed to petition to be on the ballot in both 2008 and 2010.  If corporations contributed to the Democratic Party for its hypothetical petition drives in 2008 and 2010, does anyone doubt that the petition drive would be considered an “operating cost”?  Obviously, a party can’t “operate” if it isn’t on the ballot.  But the Texas press, in its many articles on the subject of whether the Green Party should have been removed from the ballot this year, never actually discusses the “operating cost” phrase in the law.

The hypothetical law requiring a party to poll 30% of the gubernatorial vote in order to be on the ballot automatically is not entirely impossible.  Between 1931 and 1937, parties in Florida were only permitted to be on the ballot if they had received 30% of the vote for President at either of the two preceding presidential elections.  There is no federal lawsuit precedent invalidating any state’s requirement for what a party must do to be on the ballot automatically.  In Jenness v Fortson, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to think that Georgia’s law (as it existed in 1971), that a party had to poll 20% for Governor, or 20% for President in the entire nation, was acceptable.